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EQUITABLE DIVISION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY IN
MASSACHUSETTS: A BROAD GRANT OF DISCRETION TO
JUDGES OR NO DISCRETION AT ALL?
"(Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208 section 34) does
not call for a division of maritalproperty in accordance with how
title is held; nor does it call for an equal distribution of property.
Section 34 calls for an equitable distribution ...[Biecause the facts

of each case are unique, complete uniformity is impossible to
achieve and undesirable. However, predictabilityand consistency in
approach are helpful to counsel andpartiesin understandingthe decision makingprocess of a judge and thereby assisting them in settling theircases."
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon a divorce, the court faces the task of sorting out the property rights of the former spouses.2 One major approach dealing with
property division upon a divorce is the community property approach,
which eight states currently utilize.3 Under this approach, states recognize that each spouse acquires a present, vested, undivided, and
equal interest in the property acquired by either or both parties during
the marriage.4 Such marital property is divided equally upon a divorce in community property jurisdictions.5

' Hon. Edward M. Ginsburg, M.G.L. c. 208, § 34 - Some Observations
About the Division of Property Leading To PredictabilityAnd Consistency, 25
BOSTON BAR J. 10, 10 (Jan. 1981).
2
See HOMER H. CLARK AND CAROL GLOWINSKY, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 785-92 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing court's role in
determining property rights of husband and wife in divorce proceedings).
'See id. at 788 (explaining the manner in which such a regime distributes
property). Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington are the states maintaining this type of property division statute.
Id.
4 See id. at 788 (describing how property is recognized in community
property approach).
'See id. (explaining how this type of regime divides property).
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A second major approach to property division upon a divorce is
commonly known as equitable distribution and is employed by the
remaining forty-two states.6 Jurisdictions adopting such an approach
are granted the power to equitably divide, distribute, and assign property upon a divorce.7 The majority of the states following the equitable distribution approach incorporate only marital property into property division.8 Massachusetts is one of the minority of equitable distribution states adopting a statute which empowers a court to erase
the distinction between marital and separate property and include
both in equitable property divisions as it deems necessary.'
This note will examine the history of Massachusetts General Law
("Mass. Gen. Laws") chapter 208, § 34 and will analyze the case law
applying and interpreting this minority rule statute. Such examination
will illustrate how the pattern of predictability and consistency in both
approach and result existing in the Massachusetts court decisions interpreting the statute in order to determine what constitutes an equitable division of separate property arose.
Part II of the note will examine the statute and its history. Part III
will analyze the early legal applications of the amended statute and the
additional procedural requirements and safeguards that developed
through case law. Part IV will examine more recent case law dealing
with the equitable division of separate property under the amended
statute. Part V of the note will discuss the emerging trend that commentators and legal scholars suggest is arising in Massachusetts's
courts. Finally, Part VI concludes by stating that the statute's in6

See id. at 785-86 (discussing method of division utilized by majority of

states)

' See CLARK AND GLOWINSKY, supra note 2, at 785-786 (setting forth
scope of court's powers in such jurisdictions).
See id, at 786 (discussing the types of property division statutes existing
throughout country). These states classify property as either marital or separate
and authorize the courts to assign to each party their separate property and to
include only the marital property in the equitable division between the spouses.
Id.
9 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 34 (1990)(providing that the court
"may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other").
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creased procedural requirements have chipped away at the broad discretion granted to trial judges in 1974 and have produced the pattern
of predictability and consistency that has seemingly arisen in Massachusetts.
II. HISTORY

On July 19, 1974, Massachusetts clearly recognized the concept
of marriage as a partnership by empowering its courts to equitably
divide spouses' property upon divorce.' ° Prior to 1974, Massachusetts's courts did not possess the power to create a fair and just property assignment or division upon divorce. Chapter 565 of the Massachusetts Acts and Resolves of 19742 amended the earlier version of
§ 34 of Mass. Gen. Laws, chapter 208," and extended broad discretion to probate judges to create equitable property divisions upon a

divorce. "
In designing the amended statute, Massachusetts sought to bestow upon the Probate and Superior Courts the ability and power to

'oSee Monroe L. Inker et al., Alimony and Assignment of Property: The
New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1
(1975)(discussing the passage of amended § 34 of MASS. GEN. LAWS, chapter

208)

" See id. (stating that proposed statute would empower courts to divide all
property of spouses upon divorce).
12 1974 Mass Acts 574.
13 See Bianco v. Bianco, 371
Mass. 420, n.l, 358 N.E.2d 243, n.l
(1976)(interpreting for the first time the statute's amended § 34). The footnote
provides the language of the statute both prior to amendment and after the
passage of Chapter 565. Id. Prior to 1974, § 34 read: "upon a divorce, or upon
petition at any time after a divorce, the court may decree alimony to the wife, or
a part of her estate, in the nature of alimony, to the husband." Id.

See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401, 361 N.E.2d 1305, 1307
(1977)(describing the grant of broad discretion to trial judges under the amended
1"

§ 34). The court stated that such discretion was "necessary in order that courts
can handle the myriad of different fact situations which surround divorces and
arrive at a fair financial settlement in each case." 1d.
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completely dispose of all the litigants' marital and separate property. 15
The proposed revision would empower courts to divide all property
in a manner that would recognize the parties' respective contributions
to the marital partnership.16 The amended statute's eventual passage
achieved that goal by presenting the Commonwealth's trial judges
with very broad discretion regarding the division of any and all of the
spouses' property upon the marriage's dissolution.' 7
The amended statute mandated that judges exercise their new
discretionary power to create a fair and equitable division of property
with due regard to the fourteen mandatory factors listed in the statute. 8 The weight to be given to each of the mandatory factors was
left within the judge's broad discretion and the judge would not be

" See Bianco, 371 Mass. at 422, 358 N.E.2d at 245 (explaining rationale
behind Massachusetts' passage of § 34's amended version); see also Rice, 372
Mass. at 401, 361 N.E.2d at 1307 (1977)(discussing the powers which the
amended § 34 bestows upon trial courts). The case states that the purpose of § 34
is "to empower the courts to deal broadly with property and its equitable division
incident to a divorce proceeding." Id.
'6See, e.g., Savides v. Savides, 400 Mass. 250, 253, 508 N.E.2d 617, 619
(1987)(stating "the equitable factors.. .reflect a view of marriage as an implied
partnership"); Harris v. Harris, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 1004, 530 N.E.2d 368, 369
(1988)(stating purpose is "to recognize and equitably recompense parties'
respective contributions to the marital partnership"); Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass.
App. Ct. 10, 17, 358 N.E.2d 837, 842 (1977)(interpreting amended statute as
applying to value of all contributions of spouses to marital enterprise).
" See Inker, supra note 10 (discussing Massachusetts' passage of Mass.
Gen. Laws, chapter 208, amended § 34); see also Monroe Inker et al., Alimony
and Assignment of Property: A Survey of the Last Decade of MassachusettsLaw,
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 21, 22-23 (1992) (reviewing the impact and effects of the
passage of the amended § 34).
8 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 34 (1990). The statute reads in part,
the court shall consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the
parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each
for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
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required to follow any specific formula in fashioning an equitable
judgment. 9 In addition to the mandatory factors enumerated in the
statute, the revised section 34 also listed several discretionary factors
that the courts are entitled, but not mandated, to consider to create a
fair and equitable division of property.2"
In 1974, the amended § 34 guaranteed very little.2 Essentially,
the revised statute only guaranteed that trial judges would now have
the broad power and discretion to distribute all property upon a divorce, regardless of how the parties acquired title.22 Only time and
case law could determine how the courts would apply the amended
statute to achieve its goals, to monitor the exercise of the trial judge's
broad discretion to include and divide separate property, and to create
patterns of consistency and predictability in results.
III. THE EARLY LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF § 34
In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC")
made its first attempt to add consistency and structure to a § 34 property division. In King v. King,2 3 the SJC commenced its effort to
control the broad discretion granted to trial judges under the statute,
holding in part that a judge making a Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 208 §

'9 See, e.g., Harris, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 1005, 530 N.E.2d at 369
(discussing broad discretion which amended § 34 confers on trial judges); Cabot
v. Cabot, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 905, 462 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (1984)(reiterating
the discretionary power a judge possesses under the amended § 34); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1032, 1035, 461 N.E.2d 834, 835 (1984)(stressing

the judge's broad discretion to make determinations and awards under amended §
34).
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 34 (1990). The statute reads in part, "the
court may also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the
contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit." Id.
2 See Inker, supra note 10, at 6 (discussing "broad and expansive powers"
which courts were now armed with).
22
See Inker, supra note 10, at 6 (distinguishing new power under
amended § 34 from pre-existing powers).
2' 373 Mass. 37, 364 N.E.2d 1218
(1977).
"
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34 property division would now be required to make findings of fact
that show that she weighed all of the statutory factors in reaching her
decision.24 The court emphasized the importance of such findings as
an aid to review whether or not the judge considered each of the
mandatory factors.25 More importantly, the court, for the first time,
explicitly stated the absolute requirement that a judge dividing property pursuant to § 34 make such findings of fact on each of the mandatory and, if considered, discretionary factors set out in the statute in
his decision.26
In Redding v. Redding," the SJC continued its attempt to limit
the broad discretion of trial judges and to produce some level of consistency in application and results in Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 208, §
34 cases. In Redding, the SJC explicitly enumerated a second requirement in all Mass. Gen. Laws § 34 decisions made by trial
judges.28 Earlier § 34 cases suggested this requirement, but never explicitly ordered its implementation.29 This requirement mandated that
the rationale for the trial judge's decision now appear in the findings
24See

id. at 40, 364 N.E.2d at 1220 (mandating that judges indicate their
findings on record).
2 See id. (stating the rationale for such a requirement in § 34 cases)
26Id. But see Monroe Inker et al., Alimony and Assignment of Property:
A Survey of the Last Decade of Massachusetts Law, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 21,
47 (1992) (discussing 1984 amendment to Rule 52(a) which now requires
findings only when appeal is filed). The legislative intent behind this amendment
was to alleviate the burden placed on probate judges by the King mandate. Id.
Now, findings of fact would be required only if a notice of appeal was filed. Id.
If no appeal is filed, the probate judge need not make such detailed findings. Id.
398 Mass. 102, 495 N.E.2d 297 (1986).
28 See id. at 108, 495 N.E.2d at 301 (placing a second mandate on trial
judges in § 34 cases).
29 See, e.g., Bianco v. Bianco, 371 Mass. 420, 423, 358 N.E.2d 243, 245,
246 (suggesting "it would be well in future decisions" for judge to frame more
careful findings); Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 17, 358 N.E.2d 837,
842 (1977) (stating rationale does not appear either explicitly or by clear
implication); Mancuso v. Mancuso, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 973, 975, 428 N.E.2d 339,
341 (1981)(suggesting prompt attention be paid to preparation of mandatory
findings to provide explanation to parties).
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and rulings in all cases involving the application of the statute to create a fair and equitable property division.3 ° No longer would a mere
listing of findings be sufficient to support a judgment pursuant to the
statute.3 This requirement ordered a trial judge to consider and explain the effect of any important fact on her decision-making process,
or suffer potential reversal on appeal.32
In Bowring v Reid,33 the SJC reiterated this second procedural
requirement, mandating that the reasoning guiding the trial judge's
decision appear in the judgment either explicitly or by clear implication.3
In addition to explicitly restating this second requirement
placed on trial judges below, the SJC added a further safeguard
against the abuse of the trial judge's broad discretion under the statute.35 This limitation embodied a two-step appellate review of judgments made pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 208 § 34 by a trial
judge.36 Appellate courts could utilize this two-prong test to reverse
30 See

Redding, 398 Mass. at 108, 495 N.E.2d at 301 (explaining this

second requirement which trial judges faced).
3 See Monroe L. Inker and Margot Ames Clower, Towards A New Justice
In Marital Dissolution: The Massachusetts Statutory Scheme and Due Process
Analysis, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 907, 925 (1982) (discussing mandate for
required findings as "badge of personal analysis" by trial judge).
32 See Redding, 398 Mass. at 108, 495 N.E.2d at 301 (describing
requirement that trial judges place rationale on record as well).
" 399 Mass. 265, 503 N.E.2d 966 (1987).
14 See id. at 267-68, 503 N.E.2d at 968 (restating
clearly what was ordered
in earlier § 34 cases).
" See id. (describing the second procedural safeguard now mandated in §
34 property division cases).
36 See
id. (explaining appellate review process to be utilized upon property
division). The two-step analysis essentially serves to confirm that the two
procedural requirements set out in earlier cases have been met in the judgment of
the judge below. Id. The first step in the review calls for an examination of the
judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors under Mass. Gen.
Laws, chapter 208, § 34 (the fourteen mandatory factors which the judge must
consider and the four discretionary factors which the judge may consider) were
considered, and whether the judge impermissibly considered any factors not
enumerated in the statute. Bowring, 399 Mass. at 267-68, 503 N.E.2d at 968.
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a property division judgment below only if after careful analysis and
review, the appellate court determined that the judgment was plainly
wrong and excessive."
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EQUITABLE DIVISION?

The earlier decisions cited played an integral role in providing the
amended § 34 with the procedural structure it lacked upon its passage
in 1974.3" This section will examine several cases that have utilized
the amended statute in equitable divisions involving separate property
and will begin to illustrate the effect of these additional procedural
safeguards on the results of future cases.
In Bacon v. Bacon,3 9 the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed a
property division made in the trial court that substantially favored the
wife.' The court determined that the trial judge properly considered
all the statutory factors and clearly stated the rationale for the decision in the judgment below.4' The trial judge included in the property
division various assets that the wife held in her own name, as well as

The second step is to determine whether the reasons and rationale for the judge's
conclusions are apparent in her findings and rulings. Id.
" See id. at 267, 503 N.E.2d at 968 (laying out standard which appellate
court judges should apply when utilizing review process).
" See id. at 267, 503 N.E.2d at 968 (placing significant limits on broad
discretion guaranteed to trial judges by statute in 1974).
3926 Mass.

App. Ct. 117, 524 N.E.2d 401 (1988).

40 See id. at 117, 524 N.E.2d at 401 (discussing court's holding after
applying appellate review process). The court allowed the wife to retain the bulk
of her financial estate, an estate she acquired through a family trust created prior
to marriage. Id. at 119, 524 N.E.2d at 402. The court also ordered the husband
to convey to the wife his interest in the marital home, which was purchased
primarily with the wife's funds. Id. The court ordered the wife to pay the
husband $200,000 and $20,000 in attorney's fees and was ordered to assume
financial support of the minor children to the marriage. Id.
4, See Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 120-21, 524 N.E.2d at 403 (stating
reason behind court's decision to affirm trial judge's order).
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the jointly owned marital home.4" The wife acquired her separate
property assets through gifts and family inheritance.4"
Aside from the separate and marital property's source, the judge
took into consideration various other factors in her attempt to achieve
substantial justice through the property division.' In Bacon, the marriage was of medium length, ending after twelve years.45 The findings
indicated that the husband was abusive to the wife early in the marriage.46 The court also found that the husband worked occasionally
during the marriage, but that he used the money for his own purposes
and relied on the wife's funds to support the family.47 The court considered additional items indicating the husband's lack of contribution
to the marital partnership as well.48 The findings indicated that the
husband took a substantial sum of money from the family checking
account prior to leaving the marriage and that he shouldered no significant responsibility for his children's financial support.49 Finally,
the court found that the husband was very capable of supporting himself adequately at that present time as well as in the future.5" Al42

See id. at 118, 524 N.E.2d at 401 (listing assets of wife included in order

by trial judge below).
41See id. (explaining how wife acquired her assets, valued at $3,020,552).
"4Id.at 119, 524 N.E.2d at 402 (1988).
41 See id. at 120, 524 N.E.2d at 403 (reviewing time period during which
parties were married).
46 See Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct.
at 120-21, 524 N.E.2d at 403 (setting
forth aspects of relationship between parties in case)
41 See id. (discussing husband's minimal financial contributions
to
marriage).
41 See id. (highlighting the remainder of items which judge took
into
consideration in findings).
49 See id. (continuing discussion of husband's failure to contribute
financially to marriage). The court listed in its findings that the husband had
taken $34,000 from the family checking account prior to the dissolution of the
marriage. Id.
'0See Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 120-21, 524 N.E.2d at 403 (describing
husband's apparent ability to survive financially on his own without aid of wife's
assets). The court found that the husband maintained a position as an assistant
dean at Harvard University which allowed him to support himself adequately
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though the husband desired a new division to avoid any loss in his
standard of living, the appeals court affirmed the trial judge's division
because it reflected an attempt to create an equitable, rather than
equal, division based on findings of contributions, entitlement, and
realistic needs.5"
In Comins v. Comins,52 the Massachusetts Appeals Court dealt
with a different scenario when it affirmed the trial court's decision
ordering the wife to transfer her interest in the marital home and to
pay moneys from her separate personal estate to her husband.53
Again, the appellate court affirmed only after determining that the
trial judge's findings indicated that she considered all relevant factors
set forth in the statute and that her reasoning for the conclusion was
apparent in those findings.'M
In Comins, the court dealt with a lengthy, forty-eight year marriage.55 At the time of the trial judge's property division, the husband
and wife were seventy-six years old and seventy-five years old respectively, were in good health, and had no minor children.56 The
property division left the husband with net assets amounting to ap-

($38,400 per annum) and which carried retirement benefits. The husband was
living rent free in a two-bedroom apartment by virtue of a tutor position he had
taken as well. Id.
"ISee id. at 121, 524 N.E.2d at 403 (summarizing rationale of appellate
court's holding).
5233 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 595 N.E.2d 804 (1992)
See id. at 28-29, 595 N.E.2d at 805 (explaining holding of appellate
court dealing with property division below). The court included as part of the
marital estate the wife's interest in a trust ($200,000) settled and funded by the
wife's father after finding that she "had a present, enforceable, equitable right to
the use of the trust property for her benefit." Id. at 31, 595 N.E.2d at 806.
See id. (indicating that all procedural requirements were met by judge
below). The court stated, "In our view, the 'clear implication[s]' of the judge's
findings are sufficient to support the asset division ordered." Id.
5 See Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 28, 595 N.E.2d at 805 (explaining the
length of time parties to case were married).
516See id. at 29, 595 N.E.2d at 805 (summarizing couple's respective
situations and circumstances at time of property division).
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proximately forty-four percent of the marital estate, while the court
awarded the wife fifty-six percent of the same estate.57
The required findings indicated that the parties to this lengthy
marriage enjoyed a mutually satisfying relationship and that both husband and wife contributed to the marital estate, despite the fact that it
was the wife's separate trust property that was responsible for allowing the couple to maintain their level of life-style and financial success.58 Faced with these facts, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court decision awarding a portion of the wife's separate property to
the husband.5 9 The court achieved the goal of a Mass. Gen. Laws

chapter 208 § 34 property division by affirming and recognizing the
elderly husband's contribution to the marital partnership.6
6 1 the Massachusetts appeals court
In Denninger v. Denninger,

again dealt with a review of a division of separate property, holding
that it was error for the trial judge to award the husband only fifteen
percent of the parties' marital assets and that the judge gave excesSee id. at 28, 595 N.E.2d at 805 (explaining rationale of court for
ordering this percentage split for respective parties). The court reasoned that
"[s]ince gifts from the wife's family were largely responsible for permitting the
couple to enjoy a high standard of living during their marriage and to acquire the
capital assets which they possessed at the time of their divorce," the wife was
entitled to a larger share of the property division. Id. at 29-30.
'8See id. at 29, 595 N.E.2d at 805 (distinguishing facts of this case from
facts found by court in Bacon). While the trust did enhance the standard of living
of both parties, it also permitted both husband and wife to direct and contribute
their other marital assets to maintaining the high standard of living to which they
became accustomed. Id.
'9 See Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 32, 595 N.E.2d at 807 (discussing
rationale of appellate court in awarding portion of wife's assets to husband).
60 See id. at 32-33, 595 N.E.2d at 806-07 (explaining chief aim of all
property divisions under § 34). The court stated, "[t]he judge seems to have
appreciated that 'the underpinning of any order for division of property under
section 34 is... consideration of the contributions, in the statutory terms, of each
spouse, as well as any other factors in existence at the dissolution of the
partnership which have been traditionally applied in determining alimony."' Id.
6' 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 612 N.E.2d 262
(1993).
17
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sive weight to the original source of the parties' respective assets.62
The court held that the award below did not meet the requirements
set forth in the two-step method of review laid out in the Bowring
case.

63

The marriage in this case was long-term, spanning twenty-seven
years.' At the time of the divorce, the husband was seventy-one
years old and was suffering from failing health and illness that required surgery, while the wife was fifty-five years old and fairly
healthy.65 The findings indicated that during the majority of the marriage, the husband worked as a commission salesman.66 The court
also indicated that the husband placed all portions of this modest income into a joint bank account established solely to support the family.

67

Throughout the marriage, the couple and their children enjoyed a
standard of living higher than the husband's income alone could have

62

See id. at 430, 612 N.E.2d at 263 (setting forth scope of court's review

in particular case). The court determined that due to the circumstances existing
surrounding the marriage and the future of the parties, the division of property
made below could not stand as it failed to allocate assets (consisting primarily of
gifts provided by the wife's family) in a manner which would allow each party to
sustain the standard of living each became accustomed to during their marriage.

Id.
63 See

id. (summarizing holding of appeals court after review of property
division below). The court held that the judge below gave excessive weight to the
original source of the assets, and that the husband was disadvantaged by a judge's
decision below which does not flow rationally from the findings made by that
judge. Id. at 431, 612 N.E.2d at 264.
"See Denninger,34 Mass. App. Ct. at 431, 612 N.E.2d at 264 (pointing to
length of time parties to case were married).
65 See id. at 432, 612 N.E.2d at 264-65 (outlining
parties' situation at time
of divorce proceedings).
" See id. at 431, 612 N.E.2d at 264 (stating husband's occupation and
income during period of marriage). The husband's earnings ran from $30,000 to
$40,000 each year. Id.
67 See id. (acknowledging husband's contribution to family during period
of marriage).
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achieved.68 This was in large part due to the financial support of the
wife's family.69 The court certainly took notice of this fact, but dis-

tinguished the case's facts from the findings detailed in the Bacon

judgment and made its decision with due regard to the remaining
factors listed in the trial court's findings.7" Due to the marriage's
length, the husband's consistent contribution to the marital estate, and
the fact that the husband's ability to earn income was on a downward
curve, the court reversed the financial components of the divorce

judgment. 7
In Zeh v. Zeh,' the appellate court held that the trial judge did
not properly consider the husband's inheritance as part of the divisible
marital estate, and also erred in not considering her contributions to
the marriage in dividing their assets."3 As a result of this error below,

68See

Denninger,34 Mass. App. Ct. at 431, 612 N.E.2d at 264 (discussing

financial level at which family lived during the parties' marriage).
69See id. (explaining how family maintained their standard of living). The
support ranged from financial support to advice and decision making involving
finances and household management. Id.
70 See id. at 432-33, 612 N.E.2d at 265 (distinguishing facts of this case
from facts of earlier cases). In deciding that the property division below was
"off-target," the court relied on the judge's findings, which stated that "[D]ay in
and day out, for twenty plus years, the [husband] contributed all of the
[husband's] financial resources to the family and ... neither sought nor desired
(nor indeed took personal advantage of) the financial involvement of the wife's
family." Id.
71 See Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 433, 612 N.E.2d
at 265
(summarizing rationale behind court's decision to reverse trial judge's order).

The court recognized that in an equitable property division jurisdiction, as
Massachusetts is, financial parity is not the goal of such a division. Id. Despite
this fact, the court stated "the comparison of the comfortable financial security of
the wife with the fragile financial status of the husband is too stark to accept the
apportionment of assets as conformable with cases which require an attempt to
sustain the mode and level of living during the marriage." Id.
7

35 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 618 N.E.2d 1376 (1993).

See id. at 260, 618 N.E.2d at 1377 (highlighting essential holding of
court of appeals).
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the appellate court vacated the financial component of the judgment
and remanded the case to the trial court. 74
Zeh involved another lengthy marriage.75 At the time of the divorce proceedings, there were no minor children to consider.7 6 The
wife was fifty-two years old, while the husband was fifty-six years old
and both were relatively healthy. 7 The findings below indicated that
both parties maintained employment during the marriage and contributed financially to the marriage. 78 Although both parties were in their
mid-fifties at the time of the divorce, both were healthy enough to
continue their employment.79 The court also found that the wife
served as the children's primary caretaker and the home's primary
caretaker during the marriage and that her earnings from her employment went toward supporting the children and the home as well.8"
At issue in the case was the status of the separate property that
the husband's father gave to the husband to supplement the parties'
income." The court below decided not to include the husband's leg-

14

See id. at 261, 618 N.E.2d at 1377 (explaining rationale supporting

court's decision to vacate award and remand case).
71See id. (highlighting fact that couple married in 1964 and began divorce
proceedings in 1988).
76See id. at 261, 618 N.E.2d at 1377 (discussing parties' respective
living
circumstances at time of divorce).
" See Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 261, 618 N.E.2d at 1377 (explaining
health situation of respective parties to the case at time of divorce).
78 See id. at 261, 618 N.E.2d at 1378 (acknowledging
each party's
contributions to the lengthy marriage). The court below found that the husband
was self-employed as a manager of residential property owned by his father while
the wife was employed in various part-time positions. Id.
79See id. (stating court's finding that each party could continue to support
him or herself).
80See id. (acknowledging wife's contributions as homemaker as well as
financial contributions).
" See id. at 262-63, 618 N.E.2d at 1378-79 (setting forth issue facing
appellate court in this particular case).
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acy within the § 34 property division. 2 The trial judge exercised his
discretion in deciding that the gifted and inherited property would not
be included in the equitable property division since, in his mind, the3
wife had little or nothing to do with the acquisition of such property.1
The appellate court reached a different conclusion, and held that
this inheritance was an inheritance in possession, and therefore fell
well within the category of assets subject to division. 4 Including the
husband's inheritance in the property division created yet another
problem for the appellate court." If the prior property division stood
with the inheritance now included in the divisible estate, the wife's
share would amount to less than nine percent of the divisible assets.8 6
Such a result could withstand appellate review only if valid reasons
82See

Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 262-63, 618 N.E.2d at 1378-79 (reviewing

decision of trial judge below as to division of separate property). The husband
had received gifts from his father throughout the marriage in the form of property
and money until the father's death in 1984. Id. Upon the death of the father, the
husband acquired a one quarter interest in the residual estate of the father, an
inheritance interest that was valued at $421,918.82. Id. at 262, 618 N.E.2d at
1378.
" See id. at 263, 618 N.E.2d at 1379 (discussing rationale for division
order set forth by trial judge below).
See id. at 264, 618 N.E.2d at 1379 (differentiating an inheritance in
possession from an expectancy of an inheritance). The latter cannot qualify as
property subject to a § 34 property division, while the former certainly can. Zeh,
35 Mass. App. Ct. at 264, 618 N.E.2d at 1379. Since the husband's legacy was
noncontingent and had vested as of the date of the father's death, it clearly
became part of the divisible estate as "all property to which [a spouse] holds
title.. .whenever and however acquired."Id. at 265, 618 N.E.2d at 1380.
8'See id. at 266, 618 N.E.2d at 1380 (stating problem facing court once
deciding to include husband's separate property in division).
86 See id. at 266, 618 N.E.2d at 1380 (explaining why inclusion
of
husband's separate property forced court to re-address division). Even without
including within the divisible estate the assets located in the probate estate of the
husband's father, the findings indicated that, at the time of the divorce hearing,
the husband had a gross estate of $603,820 and liabilities of $73,341, while the
wife's estate amounted to $24,000 and liabilities of $32,417. Id. at 261, 618
N.E.2d at 1378.
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existed and were apparent in the trial judge's findings and rulings.8 7
The appellate court found that the judge below attached too much
importance to the assets' original source and not enough to the wife's
contributions as a homemaker, and further held that once a judge
gives weight to the discretionary factor of spousal contribution, that
judge must consider both financial and homemaking efforts and
clearly illustrate in her findings the effect that each type of contribution had on the final judgment.88 In Zeh, no reasoning or rationale
existed for such a disparate apportionment; therefore, the appellate
court remanded the case with orders to include the inheritance in the
property division, and to make explicit findings regarding consideration of the wife's spousal contributions as homemaker.89
V. OUTLOOK
In 1974, when Massachusetts amended Mass. Gen. Laws chapter
208, § 34, the statute's sole guarantee was that trial judges would
have the broad discretion to equitably assign any and all spousal
property upon a divorce to provide for a fair and just assignment of
property.9 Trial judges, with no procedural guidelines or case law to
adhere to, were presented with the immense task of utilizing their
broad discretion to divide spousal property and create an equitable
distribution.91 Early on, legal scholars began to search for some type
of predictability and consistency in attempts to achieve substantial

87See

Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 266, 618 N.E.2d at 1380 (employing

language from Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. at 267, 503 N.E.2d at 968).
88See id. (noting that judge must utilize discretionary factor in findings if
giving weight to the factor). The appellate court felt that the focus on the genesis
of the funds combined with the obvious absence of any findings or rationale
dealing with the value of the wife's homemaking contributions amounted to a
complete turning away from the goals of the statute itself. Id.
89 See id. at 266-67, 618 N.E.2d at 1381 (summarizing holding and
rationale behind court's order to remand and include separate property in
division).
" See Inker, supra note 10 (discussing the passage and purpose of the
amended Massachusetts' statute).
9'See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 10.
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justice in property divisions under the amended statute.92 After several decades of § 34 case law limiting the broad discretion of trial
judges, such predictability and consistency is93arising in property divisions which involve separate property assets.
Unlike the law in a majority of the states, Massachusetts' law
clearly dictates that separate property falls well within the boundaries
of assets available for assignment in an equitable property division.'
The issue facing a Massachusetts trial judge is deciding whether one
party's separate property should be assigned to the other party to create such an equitable division of the marital assets. 95 Massachusetts
case law indicates that the marital asset's source is a major factor for
a judge to consider in an equitable division and serves as the basis for
the presumption that separate property will generally remain with the

92 See

generally Ginsburg, supra note 1 (making observations about the

future of property division in Massachusetts).
9'See Mark A. Cohen, Division of Inheritances:A Grey Area In Divorce,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 3, 1996, at l(analyzing attorneys' roles in recent
unpublished appellate court decision dealing with a section 34 division). The
article discusses a case in which the appellate court overturned a trial court
decision awarding the husband a substantial portion of the assets available for
equitable division. Id. These assets included the husband's separate property
(inheritance). Id. The appellate court determined that the lower court decision
did not "flow rationally from the trial judge's findings", and failed the two-step
appellate test announced in Bowring, therefore requiring reversal. Id. See also
Monroe L. Inker & Charles P. Kindregan Jr., Focus on Family Law: Inherited,
Gifted and Premarital Property, MASS. LAW. WKLY., August 19, 1996, 11
(stating their belief that a consensus is developing in Massachusetts divorce law
on the topic).
94See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 208 § 34 (1990) (providing that the court
"may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other").
9'See Inker & Clower, supra note 31, at 907-911 (highlighting task of trial
judges in light of Massachusetts acceptance of marriage as "partnership model").
This "partnership model" suggests that marriage is a "joint enterprise and shared
undertaking" and that this entitles each spouse to an equitable share of any family
assets upon divorce. Id. at 908.
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party responsible for its acquisition.' However, this factor, which
weighs heavily in favor of the party bringing the separate asset into
the marriage, appears to lose its importance when additional special
circumstances materialize in a judge's findings.97
The statute's procedural requirements have combined to limit
the judge's broad discretion under the statute to such an extent that
the existence of certain special circumstances and scenarios now leave
the trial judge with no discretion when deciding whether to include
separate property to create an equitable division.9" The cases examined in this note present factual findings and results that give some
indication as to exactly what those special circumstances and scenarios are, as well as when they arise.' These special situations generally arise in lengthier marriages, as they do not have the opportunity
96

See Tanner v. Tanner, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 922, 923, 436 N.E.2d 984, 986

(1982)(stating it is appropriate to consider the original source of the assets to be
divided); see also Inker & Kindregan Jr., supra note 93, at 12 (stating that the
origin of the separate property is a factor weighing in favor of the acquiring
party).
9' See generally Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 618 N.E.2d 1218 (1993)
(reversing decision that left wife only 9% of marital assets in light of special
circumstances); see also Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 612 N.E.2d 262
(1993) (reversing trial court decision leaving elderly husband fifteen percent of
marital assets, avoiding inequitable result).
9' See generally Cohen, supra note 93, at 1 (discussing lawyer reaction to
recent case whose results illustrate this trend). The article discusses a recent
appellate court decision in which the court, armed with the facts in the required
findings, determined that the trial judge's order apportioning the separate assets
amounted to an abuse of discretion and vacated the order. Id. See also Inker &
Kindregan Jr., supra note 93, at 11 (highlighting special circumstances that call
for inclusion of separate property in property assignments).
" See, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 524 N.E.2d 401
(1988) (holding wife entitled to higher percentage of her separate assets based on
review of factors); Comins v. Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 595 N.E.2d 804
(1992) (holding wife must transfer portions of her separate assets to create
equitable results); Denninger v. Denninger, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 612 N.E.2d
262 (1993) (holding circumstances required reversal of division order issued
below to create equitable results).

19991

EQUITABLE DIVISION OFSEPARATE PROPERTY

161

to materialize in shorter marriages.'" These circumstances tend to
include the existence of children and substantial homemaking contributions, coupled with insufficient non-separate property with which
to make an equitable division.' 01 In addition, in these special circumstances the separate property assets have usually been intermingled
with the marriage and used by both parties throughout the marriage. 2 This intermingling creates a situation in which the standard
of living that each party has grown accustomed to depends upon the
separate property assets' existence. 03
Scenarios and circumstances such as these now seem to rebut the
presumption that separate property should remain with the party responsible for acquiring it and mandate an equitable division between
the party spouses which includes the separate property and rationally
flows from the required findings. ° In the absence of these special
circumstances, the presumption remains intact and trial judges retain
the discretion to leave the property with the party responsible for
bringing it into the marriage.0 5 In the face of the existence of such
special circumstances, though, any attempt by a trial judge to utilize
her discretion under the statute to exclude the separate property from
0

See Cohen, supra note 93, at 1 (stating why longer marriages are more

likely to create special circumstances); but see Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409
Mass. 211, 212-13, 565 N.E.2d 436, 437 (1991)(holding that these special
circumstances can arise in marriages of shorter duration).
'0' See Inker & Kindregan Jr., supra note 93, at 12 (highlighting special

circumstances that call for inclusion of separate property in property
assignments). The article suggests scenarios in which courts are more likely to
assign separate property. Id.
102 See Cohen, supra note 93, at I (suggesting that separate assets more
likely to be considered "communal" in these circumstances).
103 See id. at 2. (suggesting court is "less likely
to carve out assets as one
spouse's" in these circumstances).
104

See Inker & Kindregan Jr., supra note 93, at 13 (proposing that some

circumstances exist which justify including separate property in equitable
division).
'05See Inker & Kindregan Jr., supra note 93, at 13 (suggesting that
Massachusetts does not require equal division of property, even in long-term
marriages).
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the property division is very likely to be reversed upon review at the
appellate level as a decision which does not flow rationally from the
findings. "
VI. CONCLUSION
Upon passage in 1974, the amended § 34 granted very broad discretion to trial judges to equitably divide any and all property in order
to reach a fair and just property assignment. The addition of procedural guidelines and requirements to the amended statute's equitable
division process clearly limited this broad discretion. After years of
additional case law interpreting and applying the amended statute
with its added procedural requirements, the effect of the limitations
placed on judges' discretion has begun to materialize in the area of
assignment of separate property under the statute.
Several family law commentators have suggested the development of a consensus in approach and results in cases dealing with the
assignment of separate property under the statute.10 7 This suggested
consensus serves to clearly illustrate the effect of the procedural requirements and guidelines added by case law: a judge's loss of her
statutory discretion in the area of assigning separate property. When
the special circumstances enumerated above are present in the facts of
a case, it appears that a judge must include the separate property in
the equitable division and divide it in a manner that rationally flows
from the facts. When no special circumstances exist, a judge generally will not have the power to exercise her discretion to include the
separate property in the equitable division at all. Any use of discretion by a judge to create a property division under the amended statute, which deviates from these general principles, will likely be reversed on appeal as an abuse of such discretion. Only time will indi106

See Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 266-67, 618 N.E.2d at 1380-81 (stating

division was plainly unfair and outside realm of discretion in light of required
findings); see also Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 433, 612 N.E.2d at 265
(reversing trial judge as "off-target" in light of required findings and objectives of
revised statute).
107 See generally Inker & Kindregan Jr.,
supra note 93 (suggesting that a
consensus is developing through section 34 case law); see also Cohen, supra note
93, at 1 (illustrating this emerging trend through recent appellate court decision).
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cate what effect this lack of discretion in this area will have on the
manner in which family law practitioners approach and attack such
cases.0' What is clear is that the predictability and consistency in approach and results that practitioners have sought since the statute's
passage in 1974 is emerging in at least one area of equitable property
division in Massachusetts. The trial judges' loss of discretion in this
area of property division is a small price to pay to gain some level of
predictability and consistency in attempts to realize the amended statute's intended goal: achieving substantial justice in equitable property
divisions.
Toby M Jesson

10'

See id. at 1 (discussing potential effects of current trend under the

statute on practitioner's approach). The article suggests that since all marital
property is "up for grabs" in Massachusetts, the best advice for a lawyer might be
to focus on keeping the property out of the marital estate rather than seeking a
larger portion of those assets just because the separate property was gifted to or
inherited by her client. Id. at 3. The author also suggests that a person planning
to marry who wishes to retain his or her separate assets must "keep them separate
and not even minimally bring them into the marriage." Id. at 3.

